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Abstract
In this paper, we take a statistical decision-theoretic viewpoint on social choice,
putting a focus on the decision to be made on behalf of a system of agents. In
our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space, and a
loss function defined on (parameter, decision) pairs, and formulate social choice
mechanisms as decision rules that minimize expected loss. This suggests a general
framework for the design and analysis of new social choice mechanisms. We
compare Bayesian estimators, which minimize Bayesian expected loss, for the
Mallows model and the Condorcet model respectively, and the Kemeny rule. We
consider various normative properties, in addition to computational complexity
and asymptotic behavior. In particular, we show that the Bayesian estimator for the
Condorcet model satisfies some desired properties such as anonymity, neutrality,
and monotonicity, can be computed in polynomial time, and is asymptotically
different from the other two rules when the data are generated from the Condorcet
model for some ground truth parameter.
1 Introduction
Social choice studies the design and evaluation of voting rules (or rank aggregation rules). There
have been two main perspectives: reach a compromise among subjective preferences of agents, or
make an objectively correct decision. The former has been extensively studied in classical social
choice in the context of political elections, while the latter is relatively less developed, even though
it can be dated back to the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the 18th century [9].
In many multi-agent and social choice scenarios the main consideration is to achieve the second
objective, and make an objectively correct decision. Meanwhile, we also want to respect agents’
preferences and opinions, and require the voting rule to satisfy well-established normative proper-
ties in social choice. For example, when a group of friends vote to choose a restaurant for dinner,
perhaps the most important goal is to find an objectively good restaurant, but it is also important
to use a good voting rule in the social choice sense. Even for applications with less societal con-
text, e.g. using voting rules to aggregate rankings in meta-search engines [12], recommender sys-
tems [15], crowdsourcing [23], semantic webs [27], some social choice normative properties are still
desired. For example, monotonicity may be desired, which requires that raising the position of an
alternative in any vote does not hurt the alternative in the outcome of the voting rule. In addition,
we require voting rules to be efficiently computable.
Such scenarios propose the following new challenge: How can we design new voting rules with
good statistical properties as well as social choice normative properties?
To tackle this challenge, we develop a general framework that adopts statistical decision theory [3].
Our approach couples a statistical ranking model with an explicit decision space and loss function.
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Anonymity, neutrality
Monotonicity
Majority,
Condorcet Consistency Complexity Min. Bayesian risk
Kemeny Y Y N NP-hard, PNP|| -hard N
Bayesian est. of
M1ϕ (uni. prior) Y N N
NP-hard, PNP|| -hard
(Theorem 3)
Y
Bayesian est. of
M2ϕ (uni. prior) Y N N P (Theorem 4) Y
Table 1: Kemeny for winners vs. Bayesian estimators ofM1ϕ andM2ϕ to choose winners.
Given these, we can adopt Bayesian estimators as social choice mechanisms, which make decisions
to minimize the expected loss w.r.t. the posterior distribution on the parameters (called the Bayesian
risk). This provides a principled methodology for the design and analysis of new voting rules.
To show the viability of the framework, we focus on selecting multiple alternatives (the alternatives
that can be thought of as being “tied” for the first place) under a natural extension of the 0-1 loss
function for two models: letM1ϕ denote the Mallows model with fixed dispersion [22], and letM2ϕ
denote the Condorcet model proposed by Condorcet in the 18th century [9, 34]. In both models the
dispersion parameter, denoted ϕ, is taken as a fixed parameter. The difference is that in the Mallows
model the parameter space is composed of all linear orders over alternatives, while in the Condorcet
model the parameter space is composed of all possibly cyclic rankings over alternatives (irreflexive,
antisymmetric, and total binary relations).M2ϕ is a natural model that captures real-world scenarios
where the ground truth may contain cycles, or agents’ preferences are cyclic, but they have to report
a linear order due to the protocol. More importantly, as we will show later, a Bayesian estimator on
M2ϕ is superior from a computational viewpoint.
Through this approach, we obtain two voting rules as Bayesian estimators and then evaluate them
with respect to various normative properties, including anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, the ma-
jority criterion, the Condorcet criterion and consistency. Both rules satisfy anonymity, neutrality,
and monotonicity, but fail the majority criterion, Condorcet criterion,1 and consistency. Admittedly,
the two rules do not enjoy outstanding normative properties, but they are not bad either. We also
investigate the computational complexity of the two rules. Strikingly, despite the similarity of the
two models, the Bayesian estimator forM2ϕ can be computed in polynomial time, while computing
the Bayesian estimator forM1ϕ is PNP|| -hard, which means that it is at least NP-hard. Our results are
summarized in Table 1.
We also compare the asymptotic outcomes of the two rules with the Kemeny rule for winners,
which is a natural extension of the maximum likelihood estimator of M1ϕ proposed by Fishburn
[14]. It turns out that when n votes are generated underM1ϕ, all three rules select the same winner
asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) as n → ∞. When the votes are generated according toM2ϕ,
the rule forM1ϕ still selects the same winner as Kemeny a.a.s.; however, for some parameters, the
winner selected by the rule forM2ϕ is different with non-negligible probability. These are confirmed
by experiments on synthetic datasets.
Related work. Along the second perspective in social choice (to make an objectively correct de-
cision), in addition to Condorcet’s statistical approach to social choice [9, 34], most previous work
in economics, political science, and statistics focused on extending the theorem to heterogeneous,
correlated, or strategic agents for two alternatives, see [25, 1] among many others. Recent work in
computer science views agents’ votes as i.i.d. samples from a statistical model, and computes the
MLE to estimate the parameters that maximize the likelihood [10, 11, 33, 32, 2, 29, 7]. A limitation
of these approaches is that they estimate the parameters of the model, but may not directly inform
the right decision to make in the multi-agent context. The main approach has been to return the
modal rank order implied by the estimated parameters, or the alternative with the highest, predicted
marginal probability of being ranked in the top position.
There have also been some proposals to go beyond MLE in social choice. In fact, Young [34]
proposed to select a winning alternative that is “most likely to be the best (i.e., top-ranked in the true
ranking)” and provided formulas to compute it for three alternatives. This idea has been formalized
1The new voting rule forM1ϕ fails them for all ϕ < 1/
√
2.
2
and extended by Procaccia et al. [29] to choose a given number of alternatives with highest marginal
probability under the Mallows model. More recently, independent to our work, Elkind and Shah
[13] investigated a similar question for choosing multiple winners under the Condorcet model. We
will see that these are special cases of our proposed framework in Example 2. Pivato [26] conducted
a similar study to Conitzer and Sandholm [10], examining voting rules that can be interpreted as
expect-utility maximizers.
We are not aware of previous work that frames the problem of social choice from the viewpoint
of statistical decision theory, which is our main conceptual contribution. Technically, the approach
taken in this paper advocates a general paradigm of “design by statistics, evaluation by social choice
and computer science”. We are not aware of a previous work following this paradigm to design
and evaluate new rules. Moreover, the normative properties for the two voting rules investigated in
this paper are novel, even though these rules are not really novel. Our result on the computational
complexity of the first rule strengthens the NP-hardness result by Procaccia et al. [29], and the
complexity for the second rule (Theorem 5) was independently discovered by Elkind and Shah [13].
The statistical decision-theoretic framework is quite general, allowing considerations such as estima-
tors that minimize the maximum expected loss, or the maximum expected regret [3]. In a different
context, focused on uncertainty about the availability of alternatives, Lu and Boutilier [20] adopt a
decision-theoretic view of the design of an optimal voting rule. Caragiannis et al. [8] studied the
robustness of social choice mechanisms w.r.t. model uncertainty, and characterized a unique social
choice mechanism that is consistent w.r.t. a large class of ranking models.
A number of recent papers in computational social choice take utilitarian and decision-theoretical
approaches towards social choice [28, 6, 4, 5]. Most of them evaluate the joint decision w.r.t. agents’
subjective preferences, for example the sum of agents’ subjective utilities (i.e. the social welfare).
We don’t view this as fitting into the classical approach to statistical decision theory as formulated
by Wald [30]. In our framework, the joint decision is evaluated objectively w.r.t. the ground truth in
the statistical model. Several papers in machine learning developed algorithms to compute MLE or
Bayesian estimators for popular ranking models [18, 19, 21], but without considering the normative
properties of the estimators.
2 Preliminaries
In social choice, we have a set of m alternatives C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a set of n agents. Let
L(C) denote the set of all linear orders over C. For any alternative c, let Lc(C) denote the set
of linear orders over C where c is ranked at the top. Agent j uses a linear order Vj ∈ L(C) to
represent her preferences, called her vote. The collection of agents votes is called a profile, denoted
by P = {V1, . . . , Vn}. A (irresolute) voting rule r : L(C)n → (2C \ ∅) selects a set of winners that
are “tied” for the first place for every profile of n votes.
For any pair of linear orders V,W , let Kendall(V,W ) denote the Kendall-tau distance between
V and W , that is, the number of different pairwise comparisons in V and W . The Kemeny rule
(a.k.a. Kemeny-Young method) [17, 35] selects all linear orders with the minimum Kendall-tau dis-
tance from the preference profile P , that is, Kemeny(P ) = arg minW Kendall(P,W ). The most
well-known variant of Kemeny to select winning alternatives, denoted by KemenyC , is due to Fish-
burn [14], who defined it as a voting rule that selects all alternatives that are ranked in the top
position of some winning linear orders under the Kemeny rule. That is, KemenyC(P ) = {top(V ) :
V ∈ Kemeny(P )}, where top(V ) is the top-ranked alternative in V .
Voting rules are often evaluated by the following normative properties. An irresolute rule r satisfies:
• anonymity, if r is insensitive to permutations over agents;
• neutrality, if r is insensitive to permutations over alternatives;
• monotonicity, if for any P , c ∈ r(P ), and any P ′ that is obtained from P by only raising the
positions of c in one or multiple votes, then c ∈ r(P ′);
• Condorcet criterion, if for any profile P where a Condorcet winner exists, it must be the unique
winner. A Condorcet winner is the alternative that beats every other alternative in pair-wise elections.
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• majority criterion, if for any profile P where an alternative c is ranked in the top positions for
more than half of the votes, then r(P ) = {c}. If r satisfies Condorcet criterion then it also satisfies
the majority criterion.
• consistency, if for any pair of profiles P1, P2 with r(P1)∩r(P2) 6= ∅, r(P1∪P2) = r(P1)∩r(P2).
For any profile P , its weighted majority graph (WMG), denoted by WMG(P ), is a weighted directed
graph whose vertices are C, and there is an edge between any pair of alternatives (a, b) with weight
wP (a, b) = #{V ∈ P : a V b} −#{V ∈ P : b V a}.
A parametric modelM = (Θ,S,Pr) is composed of three parts: a parameter space Θ, a sample
space S composing of all datasets, and a set of probability distributions over S indexed by elements
of Θ: for each θ ∈ Θ, the distribution indexed by θ is denoted by Pr(·|θ).2
Given a parametric modelM, a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is a function fMLE : S → Θ
such that for any data P ∈ S, fMLE(P ) is a parameter that maximizes the likelihood of the data.
That is, fMLE(P ) ∈ arg maxθ∈Θ Pr(P |θ).
In this paper we focus on parametric ranking models. Given C, a parametric ranking modelMC =
(Θ,Pr) is composed of a parameter space Θ and a distribution Pr(·|θ) over L(C) for each θ ∈
Θ, such that for any number of voters n, the sample space is Sn = L(C)n, where each vote is
generated i.i.d. from Pr(·|θ). Hence, for any profile P ∈ Sn and any θ ∈ Θ, we have Pr(P |θ) =∏
V ∈P Pr(V |θ). We omit the sample space because it is determined by C and n.
Definition 1 In the Mallows model [22], a parameter is composed of a linear order W ∈ L(C)
and a dispersion parameter ϕ with 0 < ϕ < 1. For any profile P and θ = (W,ϕ), Pr(P |θ) =∏
V ∈P
1
Zϕ
Kendall(V,W ), where Z is the normalization factor with Z =
∑
V ∈L(C) ϕ
Kendall(V,W ).
Statistical decision theory [30, 3] studies scenarios where the decision maker must make a decision
d ∈ D based on the data P generated from a parametric model, generallyM = (Θ,S,Pr). The
quality of the decision is evaluated by a loss functionL : Θ×D → R, which takes the true parameter
and the decision as inputs.
In this paper, we focus on the Bayesian principle of statistical decision theory to design social
choice mechanisms as choice functions that minimize the Bayesian risk under a prior distribution
over Θ. More precisely, the Bayesian risk, RB(P, d), is the expected loss of the decision d when
the parameter is generated according to the posterior distribution given data P . That is, RB(P, d) =
Eθ|PL(θ, d). Given a parametric model M, a loss function L, and a prior distribution over Θ, a
(deterministic) Bayesian estimator fB is a decision rule that makes a deterministic decision in D
to minimize the Bayesian risk, that is, for any P ∈ S , fB(P ) ∈ arg mindRB(P, d). We focus on
deterministic estimators in this work and leave randomized estimators for future research.
Example 1 When Θ is discrete, an MLE of a parametric modelM is a Bayesian estimator of the
statistical decision problem (M,D = Θ, L0-1) under the uniform prior distribution, where L0-1 is
the 0-1 loss function such that L0-1(θ, d) = 0 if θ = d, otherwise L0-1(θ, d) = 1.
In this sense, all previous MLE approaches in social choice can be viewed as the Bayesian estimators
of a statistical decision-theoretic framework for social choice whereD = Θ, a 0-1 loss function, and
the uniform prior.
3 Our Framework
Our framework is quite general and flexible because we can choose any parametric ranking model,
any decision space, any loss function, and any prior to use the Bayesian estimators social choice
mechanisms. Common choices of both Θ and D are L(C), C, and (2C \ ∅).
Definition 2 A statistical decision-theoretic framework for social choice is a tuple F =
(MC ,D, L), where C is the set of alternatives, MC = (Θ,Pr) is a parametric ranking model,
D is the decision space, and L : Θ×D → R is a loss function.
Let B(C) denote the set of all irreflexive, antisymmetric, and total binary relations over C. For
any c ∈ C, let Bc(C) denote the relations in B(C) where c  a for all a ∈ C − {c}. It follows
2This notation should not be taken to mean a conditional distribution over S unless we are taking a Bayesian
point of view.
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that L(C) ⊆ B(C), and moreover, the Kendall-tau distance can be defined to count the number of
pairwise disagreements between elements of B(C).
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the following two parametric ranking models, where the disper-
sion is a fixed parameter.
Definition 3 (Mallows model with fixed dispersion, and the Condorcet model) Let M1ϕ denote
the Mallows model with fixed dispersion, where the parameter space is Θ = L(C) and given any
W ∈ Θ, Pr(·|W ) is Pr(·|(W,ϕ)) in the Mallows model, where ϕ is fixed.
In the Condorcet model,M2ϕ, the parameter space is Θ = B(C). For any W ∈ Θ and any profile
P , we have Pr(P |W ) = ∏V ∈P ( 1ZϕKendall(V,W )), where Z is the normalization factor such that
Z =
∑
V ∈B(C) ϕ
Kendall(V,W ), and parameter ϕ is fixed.3
M1ϕ and M2ϕ degenerate to the Condorcet model for two alternatives [9]. The Kemeny rule that
selects a linear order is an MLE ofM1ϕ for any ϕ.
We now formally define two statistical decision-theoretic frameworks associated withM1ϕ andM2ϕ,
which are the focus of the rest of our paper.
Definition 4 For Θ = L(C) or B(C), any θ ∈ Θ, and any c ∈ C, we define a loss function Ltop(θ, c)
such that Ltop(θ, c) = 0 if for all b ∈ C, c  b in θ; otherwise Ltop(θ, c) = 1.
Let F1ϕ = (M1ϕ, 2C \ ∅, Ltop) and F2ϕ = (M2ϕ, 2C \ ∅, Ltop), where for any C ⊆ C, Ltop(θ, C) =∑
c∈C Ltop(θ, c)/|C|. Let f1B (respectively, f2B) denote the Bayesian estimators of F1ϕ (respectively,
F2ϕ) under the uniform prior.
We note that Ltop in the above definition takes a parameter and a decision in 2C \ ∅ as inputs, which
makes it different from the 0-1 loss function L0-1 that takes a pair of parameters as inputs, as the
one in Example 1. Hence, f1B and f
2
B are not the MLEs of their respective models, as was the
case in Example 1. We focus on voting rules obtained by our framework with Ltop. Certainly our
framework is not limited to this loss function.
Example 2 Bayesian estimators f1B and f2B coincide with Young [34]’s idea of selecting the al-
ternative that is “most likely to be the best (i.e., top-ranked in the true ranking)”, under F1ϕ and
F2ϕ respectively. This gives a theoretical justification of Young’s idea and other followups under
our framework. Specifically, f1B is similar to rule studied by Procaccia et al. [29] and f
2
B was
independently studied by Elkind and Shah [13].
The following lemma provides a convenient way to compute the likelihood inM1ϕ andM2ϕ from
the WMG.
Lemma 1 InM1ϕ (respectively,M2ϕ), for any W ∈ L(C) (respectively, W ∈ B(C)) and any profile
P , Pr(P |W ) ∝∏cW b ϕ−wP (c,b)/2.
Proof: For any c W b, the number of times b  c in P is (n − wP (c, b))/2, which means that
Pr(P |W ) = ϕn2(n−1)/4∏cW b ϕ−wP (c,b)/2. 
4 Normative Properties of Bayesian Estimators
In this section, we compare f1B , f
2
B , and the Kemeny rule (for alternatives) w.r.t. various normative
properties. We will frequently use the following lemma, whose proof follows directly from Bayes’
rule. We recall that Lc(C) is the set of all linear orders where c is ranked in the top, and Bc(C) is the
set of binary relations in B(C) where c is ranked in the top.
Lemma 2 In F1ϕ under the uniform prior, for any profile P and any c, b ∈ C, RB(P, c) ≤ RB(P, b)
if and only if
∑
V ∈Lc(C) Pr(P |V ) ≥
∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P |V ).
In F2ϕ under the uniform prior, for any profile P and any c, b ∈ C, RB(P, c) ≤ RB(P, b) if and only
if
∑
V ∈Bc(C) Pr(P |V ) ≥
∑
V ∈Bb(C) Pr(P |V ).
3In the Condorcet model the sample space is B(C)n [31]. We study a variant with sample space L(C)n.
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Theorem 1 For any ϕ, f1B satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity. It does not satisfy
majority or the Condorcet criterion for all ϕ > 1√
2
,4 and it does not satisfy consistency.
Proof: Anonymity and neutrality are obviously satisfied.
Monotonicity. Suppose c ∈ f1B(P ). To prove that f1B satisfies monotonicity, it suffices to prove that
for any profile P ′ obtained from P by raising the position of c in one vote, c ∈ f1B(P ′). We first
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For any c ∈ C, let P ′ denote a profile obtained from P by raising the position of c in
one vote. For any W ∈ Lc(C), Pr(P ′|W ) = Pr(P |W )/ϕ; for any b ∈ C and any V ∈ Lb(C),
Pr(P ′|V ) ≤ Pr(P |V )/ϕ. For any W ′ ∈ Bc(L), Pr(P ′|W ′) ≤ Pr(P |W ′)/ϕ; for any b ∈ C and
any V ′ ∈ Bb(C), Pr(P ′|V ′) ≤ Pr(P |V ′)/ϕ.
Proof: For W ∈ Lc(C), the lemma holds because Kendall(P ′,W ) = Kendall(P,W ) − 1, and for
V ∈ Lb(C), the lemma holds because Kendall(P ′, V ) ≥ Kendall(P, V ) − 1. The proof for Bc and
Bb is similar. 
Therefore, for any b 6= c, by Lemma 3, we have ∑W∈Lc(C) Pr(P ′|W ) =∑
W∈Lc(C) Pr(P |W )/ϕ ≥
∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P |V )/ϕ ≥
∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P
′|V ), which proves
that c ∈ f1B(P ′) following Lemma 2.
Majority and the Condorcet criterion. Let C = {c, b, c3, . . . , cm}. We construct a profile P ∗
where c is ranked in the top positions for more than half of the votes, which means that c is the
Condorcet winner, but c 6∈ f1B(P ).
For any k, let P ∗ denote a profile composed of k + 1 copies of [c  b  c3  · · ·  cm] and k − 1
copies of [b  c3  · · ·  cm  c]. It is not hard to verify that the WMG of P ∗ is as in Figure 1.
c b
c3	
 cm	
c4	
 …
2k	

2	

2	

2	
2	
 2k	
 2k	

Figure 1: The WMG of the profile P ∗ where only positive edges are shown.
Lemma 4
∑
V∈Lc(C) Pr(P
∗|V )∑
W∈Lb(C) Pr(P
∗|W ) =
1+ϕ2k+···+ϕ2k(m−2)
1+ϕ2+···+ϕ2(m−2) · 1ϕ2
Proof: Let L−c = L − {c} and let P |−c denote the profile where c is removed from all rankings.∑
V ∈Lc(C)
Pr(P ∗|V ) ∝ϕ−m+1
∑
V ′∈L(C−c)
ϕKendall(P |−c,V
′)
∝ϕ−m+1
∑
V ′∈L(C−c)
∏
a,d∈C−{c}:aV ′d
ϕ−wP∗ (a,d)/2
∝ϕ−m+1
m−2∑
t=0
(
m− 2
t
)
t!(m− 2− t)!ϕktϕ−k(m−2−t) (1)
∝ϕ−(m−2)k−m+1
m−2∑
t=0
ϕ2kt
In (1), t is the number of alternatives in {c3, . . . , cm} ranked above b in V ′. There are
(
m−2
t
)
such combinations, for each of which there are t! rankings among alternatives ranked above b and
(m − 2 − t)! rankings among alternatives ranked below t. Notice that there are no edges between
alternatives in C − {c, b} in the WMG, which means that for any V ′ where exactly t alternatives
are ranked above b, the probability is proportional to ϕktϕ−k(m−2−t) by Lemma 1. Similarly,∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P
∗|V ) ∝ ϕ−k(m−2)+1−(m−2)∑m−2t=0 ϕ2t. 
4Whether f1B satisfies majority and Condorcet criterion for ϕ ≤ 1√2 is an open question.
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Since limm→∞ limk→∞ 1+ϕ
2k+···+ϕ2k(m−2)
1+ϕ2+···+ϕ2(m−2) · 1ϕ2 = 1−ϕ
2
ϕ2 , for any ϕ >
1√
2
, we can choose m and
k so that
∑
V∈Lc(C) Pr(P |V )∑
W∈Lb(C) Pr(P |W )
< 1. By Lemma 4, c is the Condorcet winner in P ∗ but it does not
minimize the Bayesian risk underM1ϕ, which means that it is not a winner under f1B .
Consistency. We construct an example to show that f1B does not satisfy consistency. In our con-
struction m and n are even, and C = {c, b, c3, c4}. Let P1 and P2 denote profiles whose WMGs are
as shown in Figure 2, respectively.
c b
c3	
 c4	

4k	
 2k	
2k	

c b
c3	
 c4	

4k	
2k	
2k	

c b
c3	
 c4	

4k	
4k	
4k	
 4k	

P1 P2 P1 ∪ P2
Figure 2: The WMGs of P1, P2, and P1 ∪ P2. Only positive edges are shown.
We provide the following lemma to compare the Bayesian risk of c and d. The proof is similar to
the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 Let P ∈ {P1, P2},
∑
V∈Lc(C) Pr(P |V )∑
W∈Lb(C) Pr(P |W )
= 3(1+ϕ
4k)
2(1+ϕ2k+ϕ4k)
Proof: Let P = P1 or P2.∑
V ∈Lc(C)
Pr(P |V ) ∝ϕ−2k
∑
V ′∈L(C−c)
ϕKendall(P |C−c ,V
′)
∝ϕ−2k3(ϕ−2k + ϕ2k)
Similarly
∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P |V ) ∝ ϕ−2k2(ϕ−2k + 1 + ϕ2k). 
For any 0 < ϕ < 1, 3(1+ϕ
4k)
2(1+ϕ2k+ϕ4k)
> 1 for all k. It is not hard to verify that f1B(P1) = f
1
B(P2) =
{c}. However, it is not hard to verify that f1B(P1 ∪ P2) = {c, b}, which means that f1B is not
consistent. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 2 For any ϕ, f2B satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity. It does not satisfy
majority, the Condorcet criterion, or consistency.
Proof: Anonymity and neutrality are obvious. The proof for monotonicity is similar to the proof for
f1B and uses the second part of Lemma 3.
Majority and Condorcet criterion. We prove that f2B does not satisfy majority or the Condorcet
criterion for the same profile P ∗ as used in the proof of Theorem 1. By Theorem 5 in the next
section, we have:∑
V ∈Bc(C) Pr(P
∗|V )∑
W∈Bb(C) Pr(P
∗|W ) =
( 11+ϕ2 )
m−1
( 1
1+ϕ2k
)m−2( 11+ϕ−2 )
= (
1 + ϕ2k
1 + ϕ2
)m−2 · 1 + ϕ
−2
1 + ϕ2
(2)
For any k ≥ 2, there exits m such that (2)< 1, which means that the Condorcet winner c is not in
f2B(P
∗).
Consistency. We use the same profiles P1 and P2 as in the proof of Theorem 1 (see Figure 2). For
P = P1 or P2, we have:∑
V ∈Bc(C) Pr(P |V )∑
W∈Bb(C) Pr(P |W )
=
( 11+1 )(
1
1+ϕ2k
)2
( 11+1 )
2( 1
1+ϕ4k
)
=
2(1 + ϕ4k)
(1 + ϕ2k)2
(3)
For any k and m, we have that the value of (3) is strictly greater than 1. It is not hard to verify that
f2B(P1) = f
2
B(P2) = {c} and f2B(P1 ∪ P2) = {c, d}, which means that f2B is not consistent. 
By Theorem 1 and 2, f1B and f
2
B do not satisfy as many desired normative properties as the Kemeny
rule (for winners). On the other hand, they minimize Bayesian risk under F1ϕ and F2ϕ, respectively,
for which Kemeny does neither. In addition, neither f1B nor f
2
B satisfy consistency, which means
that they are not positional scoring rules.
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5 Computational Complexity
We consider the following two types of decision problems.
Definition 5 In the BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION problem for a statistical decision-theoretic
framework (MC ,D, L) under a prior distribution, we are given d1, d2 ∈ D, and a profile P . We are
asked whether RB(P, d1) ≤ RB(P, d2).
We are also interested in checking whether a given alternative is the optimal decision.
Definition 6 In the OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION problem for a statistical decision-theoretic
framework (MC ,D, L) under a prior distribution, we are given d ∈ D and a profile P . We are
asked whether d minimizes the Bayesian risk RB(P, ·).
PNP|| is the class of decision problems that can be computed by a P oracle machine with polynomial
number of parallel calls to an NP oracle. A decision problem A is PNP|| -hard, if for any P
NP
|| problem
B, there exists a polynomial-time many-one reduction from B to A. It is known that PNP|| -hard
problems are NP-hard.
Theorem 3 For any ϕ, BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION for F1ϕ
under uniform prior are PNP|| -hard.
Proof: The hardness of both problems is proved by a unified polynomial-time many-one reduction
from the KEMENY WINNER problem, which was proved to be PNP|| -complete by Hemaspaandra et al.
[16]. In a KEMENY WINNER instance, we are given a profile and an alternative c, and we are asked
if c is ranked in the top of at least one V ∈ L(C) that minimizes Kendall(P, V ).
For any alternative c, the Kemeny score of c underM1ϕ is the smallest distance between the profile
P and any linear order where c is ranked in the top. We prove that when ϕ < 1m! , the Bayesian risk
of c is largely determined by the Kemeny score of c:
Lemma 6 For any ϕ < 1m! and c, b ∈ C, if the Kemeny score of c is strictly smaller than the Kemeny
score of b, then RB(P, c) < RB(P, b) forM1ϕ.
Proof: Let kc and kb denote the Kemeny scores of c and b, respectively. We have∑
V ∈Lc(C) Pr(P |V ) > 1Znϕkc > 1Znm!ϕkc−1 ≥
∑
V ∈Lb(C) Pr(P |V ), which means that
RB(P, c) < RB(P, b) by Lemma 2. 
We note that ϕ may be larger than 1m! . In our reduction, we will duplicate the input profile so
that effectively we are computing the problems for a small ϕ. Let t be any natural number such
that ϕt < 1m! . For any KEMENY WINNER instance (P, c) for alternatives C′, we add two more
alternatives {a, b} and define a profile P ′ whose WMG is as shown in Figure 3 using McGarvey’s
trick [24]. The WMG of P ′ contains the WMG(P ) as a subgraph, where the weights are 6 times of
the weights of WMG(P ); for all c′ ∈ C′, the weight of a→ c′ is 6; for all c′ ∈ C′ − {c}, the weight
of b→ c′ is 6; the weight of c→ b is 4 and the weight of b→ a is 2.
c	

a
b	

4	

6	

WMG of 6P	

6	

6	

2	

6	

6	

Figure 3: The WMG of P ′. P ∗ = tP ′.
Then, we let P ∗ = tP , which is t copies of P . It follows that for any V ∈ L(C), Pr(P ∗|V, ϕ) =
Pr(P ′|V, ϕt). By Lemma 6, if an alternative e has the strictly lowest Kemeny score for profile P ′,
then it the unique alternative that minimizes the Bayesian risk for P ′ and dispersion parameter ϕt,
which means that e minimizes the Bayesian risk for P ∗ and dispersion parameter ϕ.
Let O denote the set of linear orders over C′ that minimizes the Kendall tau distance from P and let
k denote this minimum distance. Choose an arbitrary V ′ ∈ O. Let V = [b  a  V ′]. It follows
that Kendall(P ′, V ) = 4 + 6k. If there exists W ′ ∈ O where c is ranked in the top position, then
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we let W = [a  c  b  (V ′ − {c})]. We have Kendall(P ′,W ) = 2 + 6k. If c is not a Kemeny
winner in P , then for any W where b is not ranked in the top position, Kendall(P ′,W ) ≥ 6 + 6k.
Therefore, a minimizes the Bayesian risk if and only if c is a Kemeny winner in P , and if c does not
minimizes the Bayesian risk, then b does. Hence BETTER DECISION (checking if a is better than b)
and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION (checking if a is the optimal alternative) are PNP|| -hard. 
We note that the OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION for the framework in Theorem 3 is equivalent to
checking whether a given alternative c is in f1B(P ). We do not know whether these problems are
PNP|| -complete.
Theorem 4 For any rational number ϕ,5 BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN
DECISION for F2ϕ under uniform prior are in P.
The theorem is a corollary of the following stronger theorem that provides a closed-form formula
for Bayesian loss for F2ϕ.6 We recall that for any profile P and any pair of alternatives c, b, wP (c, b)
is the weight on c→ b in the weighted majority graph of P .
Theorem 5 For F2ϕ under uniform prior, for any c ∈ C, RB(P, c) = 1−
∏
b 6=c
1
1 + ϕwP (c,b)
.
Proof: Given a profile P , for any c, b ∈ C, we let P (c  b) denote the number of times c is preferred
to b in P . For any c, b ∈ C, let K{c,b} = ϕP (cb) + ϕP (bc). The theorem is equivalent to proving
that
∑
V ∈Bc(C) Pr(V |P ) =
∏
b 6=c
ϕP (bc)
K{c,b}
. We first calculate Pr(P ).
Pr(P ) =
∑
W∈Bc(C)
Pr(P |W ) · Pr(W )
=Pr(W ) · 1
Zn
·
∏
{c,b}
(ϕP (cb) + ϕP (bc))
=Pr(W ) · 1
Zn
·
∏
{c,b}
K{c,b}
For any c ∈ C, we have:∑
W∈Bc(C)
Pr(W |P ) =
∑
W∈Bc(C)
Pr(P |W ) · Pr(W )
Pr(P )
=
Pr(W )
Pr(P )
· 1
Zn
·
∏
b6=c
ϕP (bc)
∑
V ′∈B(C−{c})
ϕKendall(P |C−c ,V
′)
=
Pr(W )
Pr(P )
· 1
Zn
·
∏
b6=c
ϕP (bc)
∏
b,e6=c
(ϕP (eb) + ϕP (be)) =
∏
b 6=c
ϕP (bc)
K{c,b}

The comparisons of Kemeny, f1B , and f
2
B are summarized in Table 1. According to the criteria we
considered, none of the three outperforms the others. Kemeny does well in normative properties, but
does not minimize Bayesian risk under either F1ϕ or F2ϕ, and is hard to compute. f1B minimizes the
Bayesian risk under F1ϕ, but is hard to compute. We would like to highlight f2B , which minimizes
the Bayesian risk under F2ϕ, and more importantly, can be computed in polynomial time despite
the similarity between F1ϕ and F2ϕ. This makes f2B a practical voting rule that is also justified by
Condorcet’s model.
5We require ϕ to be rational to avoid representational issues.
6The formula resembles Young’s calculation for three alternatives [34], where it was not clear whether the
calculation was done for F2ϕ. Recently it was clarified by Xia [31] that this is indeed the case.
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6 Asymptotic Comparisons
In this section, we ask the following question: as the number of voters, n → ∞, what is the
probability that Kemeny, f1B , and f
2
B choose different winners?
We show that when the data is generated from M1ϕ, all three methods are equal asymptotically
almost surely (a.a.s.), that is, they are equal with probability 1 as n→∞.
Theorem 6 Let Pn denote a profile of n votes generated i.i.d. fromM1ϕ given W ∈ Lc(C). Then,
Prn→∞(Kemeny(Pn) = f1B(Pn) = f
2
B(Pn) = c) = 1.
Proof sketch: It is not hard to see that asymptotically almost surely, for any pair of alternatives
a, b ∈ C, the number of times a  b in Pn is (1 + o(1))nPr(a  b|W ). As a corollary of a stronger
theorem by [7], as n → ∞, c is the Condorcet winner, which means that Prn→∞(Kemeny(Pn) =
c) = 1.
We now prove a lemma that will be useful for f1B and f
2
B .
Lemma 7 For any W ∈ Lc(C), any alternatives a, b that are different from c, Pr(c  b|W ) >
Pr(a  b|W ).
Proof: We have Pr(c  b|W )− Pr(a  b|W ) = Pr(c  b  a|W )− Pr(a  b  c|W ). For any
linear order Vcba where c  b  a, we let Vabc denote the linear order obtained from Vcba
by switching the positions of c and a. It follows that Kendall(Vcba,W ) < Kendall(Vabc,W ),
which means that Pr(c  b|W ) > Pr(a  b|W ). 
To prove the theorem for f1B , it suffices to prove that for any b 6= c and any 0 < ϕ < 1, asymp-
totically almost surely, we have
∑
V ∈Lc(C) ϕ
Kendall(Pn,V ) >
∑
V ∈Lb(C) ϕ
Kendall(Pn,V ). For any
Vc ∈ Lc(C), we let Vb denote the linear order obtained from Vc by exchanging the positions of
c and b, which means that Vb ∈ Lb(C).
Lemma 8 Prn→∞(Kendall(Pn, Vc) < Kendall(Pn, Vb)) = 1.
Proof: Given Vc, let C′ denote the set of alternatives between c and b in Vc. We
have Kendall(Pn, Vb) − Kendall(Pn, Vc) =
∑
a∈C′ [wPn(a, b) − wPn(a, c)] + wPn(c, b) =∑
a∈C′ 2n[Pr(a  b|W ) − Pr(a  c|W )] + n(2 Pr(c  b|W ) − 1) + o(n), where we recall
that wPn(a  b) = Pn(a  b) − Pn(b  a). By Lemma 7, for all a that is different from b and c,
Pr(c  a|W ) > Pr(b  a|W ), which means Pr(a  b|W ) − Pr(a  c|W ) > 0. Since c is the
Condorcet winner asymptotically almost sure, Pr(c  b|W ) > 1/2. This proofs the claim. 
By Lemma 8, Prn→∞(∀Vc ∈ Lc(C),Kendall(Pn, Vc) < Kendall(Pn, Vd)) = 1, which means that
Pr
n→∞
(
∀Vc ∈ Lc(C), ϕKendall(Pn,Vc) < ϕKendall(Pn,Vd)
)
= 1
Hence, Prn→∞(
∑
V ∈Lc(C) ϕ
Kendall(Pn,V ) >
∑
V ∈Ld(C) ϕ
Kendall(Pn,V )) = 1. This proves the theo-
rem for f1B .
We use Theorem 5 and Lemma 7 to prove the theorem for f2B . We note that
ϕPn(bc)
K{c,b}
=
1
1+ϕPn(cb)−Pn(bc) =
1
1+ϕ2Pn(cb)−n . By Lemma 7, Pr(c  b|W ) > Pr(a  b|W ), which means
that asymptotically almost surely, we have the following steps of reasoning:
(1) Pn(c  b) > Pn(a  b) for all a, b.
(2) 1
1+ϕ2Pn(cb)−n >
1
1+ϕ2Pn(ab)−n for all a and b.
(3) ϕ
Pn(bc)
K{c,b}
> ϕ
Pn(ba)
K{a,b}
.
(4) For any a 6= c,∏b 6=c ϕPn(bc)K{c,b} >∏b 6=a ϕPn(ba)K{a,b} .
Finally, applying Theorem 5 to (4), c is the unique winner asymptotically almost surely. This com-
pletes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 7 For any W ∈ B(C) and any ϕ, f1B(Pn) = Kemeny(Pn) a.a.s. as n → ∞ and votes in
Pn are generated i.i.d. fromM2ϕ given W .
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For any m ≥ 5, there exists W ∈ B(C) such that for any ϕ, there exists  > 0 such that with
probability at least , f1B(Pn) 6= f2B(Pn) and Kemeny(Pn) 6= f2B(Pn) as n → ∞ and votes in Pn
are generated i.i.d. fromM2ϕ given W .
Proof sketch: Due to the Central Limit Theorem, for any V,W ∈ B(C), |Kendall(Pn, V ) −
Kendall(Pn,W )| = Ω(
√
n) a.a.s. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, any f1B winner c maximizes∑
Vc∈Lc(C) ϕ
Kendall(Pn,Vc) ≈ maxVc∈Lc(C) ϕKendall(Pn,Vc) a.a.s. This means that c is the Kemeny
winner a.a.s.
For the second part, we sketch a proof for m = 5. Other cases can be proved similarly. Let W
denote the binary relation as shown in Figure 4.
c1	

c2	

c3	
c4	

c5	

Figure 4: W ∈ B(C) for m = 5.
It can be verified that for all i ≤ 5, Pr(ci  ci+1|W ) (we let c1 = c6) are the same and are larger
than 1/2, denoted by p1; for all i ≤ 5, Pr(ci  ci+2|W ) are the same and are larger than 1/2,
denoted by p2. We define a random variable Xcb for any c W b such that for any V ∈ L(C), if
c V b then Xcb = 1 otherwise Xcb = −1.
Lemma 9 {Xcb : c W b} are not linearly correlated.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction {Xcb : c W b} are linearly correlated. For anyXcb
whose coefficient is non-zero, there exists a linear order V where c and b are ranked adjacently. Let
V ′ denote the linear order obtained from V by switching the positions of c and b. We note thta
Xcb(V ) = −Xcb(V ′), and other random variables in {Xcb : c W b} take the same values at
V and V ′, this leads to a contradiction. 
Then, it follows from the multivariate Lindeberg-Le´vy Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [? , Theorem
D.18A] that {(∑nj=1Xcb − pn)/√n : c W b} converges in distribution to a multivariate normal
distribution N (0,Σ), where Σ is the covariance matrix, and is non-singular by Lemma 9. We note
that
∑n
j=1Xcb = Pn(c  b).
Hence, with positive probability the following hold at the same time in WMG(Pn):
• 0 < wPn(c5, c1)− (2p1 − 1)n <
√
n; 0 < wPn(c4, c1)− (2p2 − 1)n <
√
n.
• √n < wPn(c1, c2) − (2p1 − 1)n < 2
√
n;
√
n < wPn(c5, c2) − (2p2 − 1)n < 2
√
n; 0 <
wPn(c1, c3)− (2p2 − 1)n <
√
n.
• For any other ci W cj not mentioned above, 5
√
n < wPn(ci, cj)− (2 Pr(ci  cj |W )− 1)n.
If Pn satisfies all above conditions, then by Theorem 5 f2B(Pn) = {c1}. Meanwhile,
Kemeny(Pn) = f1B(Pn) = {c2} with [c2  c3  c4  c5  c1] minimizing the total Kendall-tau
distance. This shows that f2B(Pn) 6= Kemeny(Pn) with non-negligible probability as n → ∞, and
completes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 6 suggests that, when n is large and the votes are generated fromM1ϕ, all of f1B , f2B , and
Kemeny will choose the alternative ranked in the top of the ground truth as the winner. Similar
observations have been made for other voting rules by [7]. On the other hand, Theorem 7 tells
us that when the votes are generated from M2ϕ, interestingly, for some ground truth parameter
f2B is different from the other two with non-negligible probability, and as we will see in the next
subsection, we are very confident that such probability is quite large (about 30% for given W shown
in Figure 4).
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Figure 5: Probability that g is different from Kemeny underM2ϕ.
6.1 Experiments
By Theorem 6 and 7, Kemeny and f1B are asymptotically equal when the data are generated fromM1ϕ orM2ϕ. Hence, we focus on the comparison between rule f2B and Kemeny using synthetic data
generated fromM2ϕ given the binary relation W illustrated in Figure 4.
By Theorem 5, the exact computation of Bayesian risk involves computing ϕΩ(n), which is expo-
nentially small for large n since ϕ < 1. Hence, we need a special data structure to handle the
computation of f2B , because a straightforward implementation easily loses precision. In our experi-
ments, we use the following approximation for f2B :
Definition 7 For any c ∈ C and profile P , let s(c, P ) = ∑b:wP (b,c)>0 wP (b, c). Let g be the voting
rule such that for any profile P , g(P ) = arg minc s(c, P ).
In words, g selects the alternative c with the minimum total weight on the incoming edges
in the WMG. By Theorem 5, a f2B winner c maximizes
∏
b6=c
ϕP (bc)
K{c,b}
=
∏
b 6=c
1
1+ϕwP (c,b)
,
which means that c minimizes
∏
b 6=c(1 + ϕ
wP (c,b)). In our experiments,
∏
b 6=c(1 + ϕ
wP (c,b)) is
(1 + o(1))ϕ
∑
b:wP (b,c)>0
wP (b,c) for reasonably large n. Therefore, g is a good approximation of f2B
with reasonably large n. Formally, this is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 For any W ∈ B(C) and any ϕ, f2B(Pn) = g(Pn) a.a.s. as n→∞ and votes in Pn are
generated i.i.d. fromM2ϕ given W .
In our experiments, data are generated by M2ϕ given W in Figure 4 for m = 5, n ∈
{100, 200, . . . , 2000}, and ϕ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. For each setting we generate 1500 profiles, and
calculate the percentage for g and Kemeny to be different. The results are shown in Figuire 5.
We observe that for ϕ = 0.1 and 0.5, the probability for g(Pn) 6= Kemeny(Pn) is about 30% for
most n in our experiments; when ϕ = 0.9, the probability is about 10%. In light of Theorem 8,
these results confirm Theorem 7. We have also conducted similar experiments forM1ϕ, and found
that the g winner is the same as the Kemeny winner in all 10000 randomly generated profiles with
m = 5, n = 100. This provides a sanity check for Theorem 6.
7 Conclusions
There are some immediate open questions for future work, including the characterization of the exact
computational complexity of f1B , and the normative properties of g. More generally, it is interesting
to study the design and analysis of new voting rules using the proposed statistical decision-theoretic
framework under alternative probabilistic models, e.g. random utility models, other loss functions,
e.g. a smoother loss function, and other sample spaces including partial orders of a fixed set of
k alternatives. We also plan to design and evaluate randomized estimators, and estimators that
minimizes the maximum expected loss or the maximum expected regret [3].
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